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Abstract. If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable 
information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is 
affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our 
background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is.  We consider the 
following question.  Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it 
the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are in 
believing the new information, ceteris paribus?  We show that if we consider sets of 
information items of any size (Holism), and if we assume that there exists a coherence 
Ordering over such sets and that coherence is a function of the probability distribution 
over the propositions in such sets (Probabilism), then Separability fails to hold.   
 
1. Introduction.  You hear someone mention at a party that there are large colonies of 
wild boar roaming the southern tip of Greenland.  You read in the newspaper that the 
Japanese stock market will drop and that the unemployment rate in the US will rise.  
Should you believe this information?  It depends.  Spelling out the factors that it depends 
on and in what ways it depends on these factors is the challenge for a theory of justified 
belief.  We should assess how coherent the new information is.  Does it mesh well with 
what we believe about wild boars, climate conditions in Greenland, economic matters,...?  
Is there a connection between the Japanese stock market and the US unemployment rate?  
We should also ask ourselves how reliable the information source is given our 
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background beliefs.  What expertise does our information source have about the fauna of 
Greenland and of economic matters?  
Justification is not an all or nothing matter, but rather a matter of degree: If the 
sources are independent, then the more coherent the information is and the more reliable 
the informers are, the more justified we are to accept the new information.  This is clearly 
a truism, but put in this format the thesis raises an interesting question that has not 
received any attention amongst epistemologists, viz. are coherence and reliability 
separable factors in their impact on justified belief?  Let us explain.  Suppose that 
medical doctors routinely prescribe X-ine and Y-ine to improve some function or other.  
We are curious to know why X-ine and Y-ine are good for performance enhancement.  
The first thing we might wish to find out is whether the effectiveness of X-ine and Y-ine 
are separable.  Is X-ine a good thing for performance enhancement, ceteris paribus?  The 
ceteris paribus clause requires that we keep the dosage of Y-ine fixed.  Is Y-ine a good 
thing for performance enhancement, ceteris paribus?  The ceteris paribus clause requires 
that we keep the dosage of X-ine fixed.  If the answer is twice yes then we have gained 
some headway on the route to understanding how the treatment works.  There may still 
be some interaction effects between X-ine and Y-ine, but at least we can say that the 
treatment works is at least partly because X-ine is effective and because Y-ine is 
effective.  The impact of X-ine and Y-ine are separable.  But things are more interesting 
when X-ine is not effective, or is even counter effective, for certain dosages of Y-ine, or 
vice versa: then we cannot say that X-ine, respectively Y-ine, are effective by themselves.  
There are curious interaction effects between X-ine and Y-ine that need to be studied to 
understand the workings of X-ine and Y-ine.   
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Returning from our excursion into medicine, the question that will concern us is 
whether coherence and reliability are separable factors.  We will take up one direction1 of 
this question here, viz.  
 
(i) Separability.  The more coherent the new information is, the more justified we 
are in believing the new information, ceteris paribus. 
 
Following John Bender (1989: 2-3), we distinguish between coherence as a relation 
between a single new item of information and my background beliefs as opposed to as a 
property of a set of new information items.  The former represents an atomistic 
conception of coherence.  For every particular new item of information, we ask how well 
it meshes with our background beliefs.  The latter represents a holistic conception of 
coherence.  For a set of new items of information, we ask how coherent this set is 
internally, i.e. how well the items mesh with each other.  
 
2. The Atomistic Conception of Coherence. The better a new item of information fits in 
with our background beliefs, the more coherent it is on the atomistic conception of 
coherence.  We define a probabilistic measure of how coherent the information is 
                                                          
1 We will not take up the other direction of this question, viz. is it true that the more reliable the sources are, 
the more justified we are in believing the new information ceteris paribus, here.  Following Bovens and 
Hartmann (2003a: 28-88), it can be shown that two information sets are equally coherent if and only if they 
are characterized by the same weight vector (2003a: 17), which is introduced below.  From equation (2.3) 
(2003a: 31), we can then read off that the posterior joint probability of the propositions contained in equally 
coherent information sets is greater when the information is provided by more reliable sources.   
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 (1)  c({I}) = Prob(I|K), 
 
where I is the newly acquired item of information, {I} is the information set, and K are 
our background beliefs.  Let ’ be the relation of ‘... being equally or more coherent than 
...’.  An information set {I} ’ {I’} iff c({I}) ≥ c({I’}).  We let P(.) = Prob(.|K) for 
simplicity of representation.   
There are many theoretical commitments packed into this appeal to a measure of 
coherence, viz.   
 
(ii) Atomism.  The relation ’ is defined over information singletons, 
 
 (iii) Ordering.  ’ is an ordering, i.e. the relation ’ is transitive and complete, and 
 
 (iv) Probabilism. A coherence measure over information sets is a function of the 
probability distribution over the propositional variables whose positive values are 
the constituents of the information set. 
 
In the case of a singleton set, I is the propositional variable, whose positive value is I and 
whose negative value is ¬I. 
The process through which the information was obtained may be more or less 
reliable.  Think of an information gathering process as a medical test.  The reliability of a 
medical test can be assessed by means of the following two conditional probabilities: 
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P(R|I), i.e. the conditional probability that the test will be positive (R), given that you 
have the disease (I), and P(R|¬I), i.e. the conditional probability that the test will be 
positive given that you do not have the disease.  A fully reliable test says of what is that it 
is and of what is not that it is not: P(R|I) = 1 and P(R|¬I) = 0.  An entirely worthless test 
is a test that is no better than consulting some random device: the chance of getting a 
positive report is the same whether you have the disease or not, i.e. P(R|I) = P(R|¬I).    
We are interested in partially reliable tests, i.e. tests for which P(R|I) > P(R|¬I) > 0.  
Such tests can be located on the continuum between both fully reliable tests and entirely 
worthless tests.  Hence, for partially reliable tests, the likelihood ratio2 
 
(2)  x = 
I)|(R
I)|(R
P
P ¬  ∈  (0, 1). 
 
We assign a degree of reliability  
 
(3)  r({I}) := l – x  
 
                                                          
2 One needs to be careful when talking about the likelihood ratio in Bayesian confirmation theory.  
Sometimes the likelihood ratio is defined as in (2) (e.g. in Howson and Urbach 1993: 29), sometimes as the 
reciprocal of the formula in (5) (e.g. in Pearl 1988: 34).  
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to the information that you have the disease as provided by the test.  Similarly, let us 
suppose that our background information permits us to assign a degree of reliability 
r({I}) to the information as provided by a partially reliable source.3   
It follows from Bayes Theorem that our degree of confidence in the newly 
acquired information is  
 
(4)  P*(I) = P(I|R) = 
({I})
({I})
({I})1(
1
r
c
r +−
. 
 
Our definition of a coherence measure satisfies Atomism, Probabilism, and Ordering.  It 
is easy to see that Separability holds.  From (4), it is clear that whatever the value of 
r({I}), raising the value of c({I}) lowers the value of the denominator and hence raises 
our degree of confidence that I.  We conclude that  
 
Theorem 1. Separability, Atomism, Ordering and Probabilism are consistent.  
 
3. The Holistic Conception of Coherence.  Suppose that I receive multiple information 
items from different sources.  Some information sets hang together better, fit together 
better, mesh better than others,...  This permits us to state the following commitment: 
 
 (v) Holism.  The relation ’ is defined over non-empty information sets. 
                                                          
3 Our model of a partially reliable source matches interpretation (ii) of ‘dubious information-gathering 
processes’ in Bovens and Olsson (2000: 698).  
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 We have defined Holism and Atomism so that Holism entails Atomism, but not vice versa.  
Nothing hinges on this.  We could also have defined both theses so that they are mutually 
exclusive.  The atomistic relation ’ would then be defined over singletons and the 
holistic relation ’ over n-tuples for n ≥ 2.  We will now show that Separability, Holism, 
Ordering and Probabilism are an inconsistent quadruple.   
To say that an information set contains multiple items of information is to say that 
we have received the information from multiple sources.  Furthermore, these multiple 
sources should not act in unison, since then the situation is indistinguishable from having 
received the information from a single source.  In our model to determine the degree of 
confidence that the information is true we stipulate that the information gathering 
processes are independent.   
In Hume’s Abject Failure, John Earman (2000: 56–9) develops a model to 
determine the probability that at least one witness report of a miracle is true when the 
reports come from independent witnesses.  We develop a parallel model, but are 
interested not in the posterior probability that the disjunction of the witness reports is 
true, but rather in the posterior probability that the conjunction of the witness reports is 
true (see also Bovens and Olsson, 2000: 690 and 696–70 and 2002: 143–4). 
Suppose that there are n independent and partially reliable sources and each 
source i informs us of a proposition Ii, for i = 1,..., n, so that the information set is {I1,..., 
In}.  Let us name Ii a fact variable and Ri a report variable.  Ri can take on two values, 
viz. Ri, i.e. after consultation with the proper source, there is a report to the effect that Ii is 
the case, and ¬Ri i.e. after consultation with the proper source, there is no report to the 
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effect that Ii is the case.  We construct a joint probability distribution P over I1, ..., In, 
R1,..., Rn satisfying the constraint that the sources are independent and partially reliable.   
We model the independence of the sources by stipulating that P respects the 
following conditional independences:   
 
(5)  Ri  _||_ I1, R1,..., Ii-1, Ri-1, Ii+1, Ri+1,..., In, Rn|Ii   for i = 1,..., n 
 
or, in words, Ri  is probabilistically independent of I1, R1,..., Ii-1, Ri-1, Ii+1, Ri+1,..., In, Rn, 
given Ii, for i = 1,..., n.  There are two aspects to this characterization of independent 
witnesses, viz. Ii screens off Ri from all other fact variables Ij and from all other report 
variables Rj.  The reports of independent witnesses are determined by whether the facts 
they report on hold or not.  They may not always assess things correctly, but they are not 
influenced in their reports by whether other facts hold, or by whether there are reports to 
the effect that other reports hold.  We also assume that all witnesses are equally reliable, 
i.e. r({Ii}) = r for all witnesses i = 1,..., n.  
It can be shown4 that, given the constraints on P,  
  
(6)  P*(I1,..., In) = P(I1,..., In|R1,..., Rn) = 
∑
=
n
i
i
i ra
a
0
0
)-(1
 , 
 
                                                          
4 The proof is straightforward: Apply Bayes Theorem to the right-hand side of (7); simplify on grounds of 
the conditional independences in (6), divide the numerator and denominator by P(Ri|Ii)n and substitute in 
the measure r and the parameters ai for i = 1,..., n, as defined underneath.       
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where ai is the probability that exactly i propositions are false.  Note that = 1.  For 
example, for an information triple containing the propositions I
∑
=
n
i
ia
0
1, I2, and I3, a2 = P(I1, ¬I2, 
¬I3) + P(¬I1, I2, ¬I3) + P(I1, ¬I2, ¬I3).  The vector <a0, ..., an> is the weight vector of the 
probability distribution P defined over the propositional variables I1, ..., In.  Throughout 
this paper we assume that a0  0.≠   
The obvious question is: What is a proper measure of coherence c({I1,..., In})?  
Luckily, we do not need to answer this question to show that Separability fails, if Holism, 
Ordering, and Probabilism hold.  By Probabilism, c({I1,..., In}) must be a function of the 
probability distribution.  Now let us take a probability distribution P over an information 
pair {I1, I2} and a probability distribution P’ over an information pair {I1’, I2’}.  We 
construct the weight vectors <a0, a1, a2> and <a0’, a1’, a2’>.  Let <a0, a1, a2> = <.20, .70, 
.10> and <a0’, a1’, a2’> = <.10, .10, .80>.  We calculate our degrees of confidence in the 
new information by means of the expression in (6) when r is .90:  
 
(7)  P’*(I1’, I2’)  .85 > .74 ≈  P*(I≈ 1, I2) 
 
and when r = .50: 
 
(8)  P’*(I1’, I2’)  .29 < .35 ≈  P*(I≈ 1, I2) 
 
By Ordering, either {I1, I2} is more or equally coherent than {I1’, I2’}, or vice versa.  
Suppose the former is true.  Then Separability fails, i.e. it is false that the more coherent 
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the new information is, the more justified we are to believe that the new information is 
true, ceteris paribus, since for r = . 90, this fails to hold.  Suppose the latter is true.  Then 
Separability fails as well, since for r = .50 it fails to hold.  Hence, without even having 
defined a probabilistic measure of coherence for information pairs, we can conclude that 
Separability fails. 
We anticipate the following rejoinder.  There are other features of the probability 
distribution than coherence that also determine our degree of confidence that the new 
information is true.  One might suggest that it is not only the coherence of the new 
information, but also how expected the new information is given our background 
knowledge.5  The obvious measure of expectancy is a0, i.e. the prior joint probability of 
the new information.  This measure indicates how expected the new information is in its 
totality relative to our background knowledge.  So the rejoinder goes as follows.  In 
assessing whether coherence is separable, the ceteris paribus clause should cover not 
only the reliability of the witnesses but also the expectancy of the information set.   
This defense could indeed be made successful if we restrict our attention to 
information pairs.  To see this, let Dualism, like Atomism, be a special case of Holism: 
 
(v) Dualism.  The relation ’ is defined over information pairs.   
 
                                                          
5 Another way to conceive of this is that the expectancy of the information items is the coherence of the 
conjunction of the new information items on the atomistic conception of coherence.  a0  is a measure of 
how well the information, taken as a whole, fits in with our background beliefs. (Cf. Bovens and Hartmann 
(2005)).    
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For all existing measures of coherence, the following claim holds true.  If two 
information pairs have the same expectancy, then the coherence of the information pair is 
a negative function of a1.  Given this rather innocent assumption, we show that 
 
Theorem 2. Separability, Dualism, Ordering and Probabilism are consistent.  
 
To respect Dualism, we compare two information pairs {I1, I2} and {I1’, I2’}.  {I1, I2} has 
the corresponding weight vector <a0, a1, a2> and  {I1’, I2’} has the corresponding weight 
vector <a0’, a1’, a2’>.  By Probabilism, a coherence measure is a function of the 
probability distribution over the propositional variables whose positive values are the 
propositions in the information set.  Certainly, we can define a coherence measure that 
respects Ordering.  It is easy to show that for all existing coherence measures that respect 
Dualism, Probabilism, and Ordering, the information pair S is more or equally coherent 
than an information pair S’ with equal expectancy if and only if a1’≥  a1.  It follows from 
(6) that  
 
(9) P*(I1, I2) = 
)-()1( 21
2
00
0
xxaxaa
a
+−+  
 
Separability holds if we let the ceteris paribus clause cover both the reliability and the 
expectancy.  If we keep the reliability of the witnesses and the expectancy of the 
information set fixed, i.e. we keep r (and hence x) fixed and let a0 = a0’, then more 
coherent information pairs, i.e. information pairs with a lower value of a1 in their weight 
vectors, warrant higher degrees of confidence.   
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However, let us return to the general case, substituting Holism for Dualism again.  
Even if we assume that the ceteris paribus clause covers both the reliability and the 
expectancy, Separability still fails for larger information sets.  Let us take a probability 
distribution P over an information triple {I1, I2, I3} and a probability distribution P’ over 
an information triple {I1’, I2’, I3’} with the associated weight vectors <a0, ..., a3> and 
<a0’, ..., a3’>.  Let <a0, ..., a3> = <.05, .30, .10, .55> and <a0’, ..., a2’> = <.05, .20, .70, 
.05>. 
Now let us calculate our degrees of confidence in the new information by means 
of the expression in (6) when r is .90:  
 
(10)  P’*(I1’, I2’, I3’)  .65 > .61 ≈ ≈  P*(I1, I2, I3) 
 
and when r is .50: 
 
(11)  P’*(I1’, I2’, I3’)  .15 < .17 ≈ ≈  P*(I1, I2, I3) 
 
Notice that the expectancy of the information, as measured by a0, is fixed between both 
information sets.  Whatever coherence ordering we impose on these information triples, 
Separability fails.  It is false that the more coherent the information set, the greater our 
degree of confidence that the information is true, ceteris paribus, even if we let the 
ceteris paribus clause cover the reliability and the expectancy of the new information.  If 
we assume that {I1, I2, I3} is more coherent than {I1’, I2’, I3’}, then Separability fails 
when we set r =.90.  If we assume that {I1’, I2’, I3’} is more coherent than {I1, I2, I3}, 
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then Separability fails when we set r =.50.  Hence, either way, Separability fails.6  
Hence, we have shown that 
 
Theorem 3. Separability, Holism, Ordering and Probabilism are inconsistent. 
  
This theorem holds even if we let the ceteris paribus clause in Separability cover both 
reliability and expectancy.   
We provide the following generalization of this counter example for n > 3.  It 
follows from (6) that 
(12)  P*(I1,..., In) = 
)-()1(
1
1
2
00
0
ni
i
n
i
xxaxaa
a
∑−
=
+−+
    
 
Take an information n-tuple {I1,...,  In} with weight vector <a0, a1, ..., an>.   We show that 
there is an information n-tuple {I1’,...,  In’} with weight vector <a0, a1’, ..., an’> so that 
Separability, Holism, Probabilism and Ordering are inconsistent.  Note that P*(I1,..., In) 
=  P*(I1’,..., In’) if and only if 
                                                          
6 The reader who is familiar with the literature on separability may wish to know whether it is weak or 
strong separability that is in question.  (See Broome, 1991: 60-89.)  As long as we consider only two 
determinants of our degree of confidence, viz. reliability and coherence, weak separability and strong 
separability are coextensive.  When we are considering three determinants of our degrees of confidence, 
viz. reliability, coherence and expectancy, weak separability and strong separability are no longer 
coextensive.  We have shown that weak separability fails.  Since strong separability entails weak 
separability, strong separability fails as well.  In Bovens and Hartmann (2005) we argue that weak but not 
strong separability holds for the components of a coherence vector.   
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 (13)   =           ∆ )-)('-(
1
1
ni
ii
n
i
xxaa∑−
=
 
For some k such that 2 ≤  k  n–2 and a≤ k ≠  0, let  
 
(14)   ak–1’ = ak–1 +  δ
 ak’ = ak – 3  δ
 ak+1’ = ak+1 + 2  δ
 
with 0 < δ < ak /3 and let aj’ = aj for all other components.  We can then calculate that 
 
(15)    = x∆ δ k–1(x – 1/2)(x – 1). 
 
Hence, P*(I1,..., In) =  P*(I1’,..., In’) for (and only for) x = 0, ½, and 1, and so for (and 
only for) r = 0, ½, and 1.  Furthermore, since P* is a continuous function of r, P*(I1,..., 
In) < P*(I1’,..., In’) for r (0, ½) and P*(I∈ 1,..., In) > P*(I1’,..., In’) for r (½, 1).  This 
algorithm is just one way to obtain counter examples to the claim that Holism, 
Probabilism, Separability, and Ordering are consistent.  There are many ways of doing 
so.   
∈
 
4. Discussion.  So what can be given up in the inconsistent quadruple of Probabilism, 
Separability, Holism and Ordering?  We will argue that giving up any of these principles 
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is at least prima facie unappealing.  The set up of our argument mirrors Arrow’s 
impossibility result for social welfare rankings (1963).  Our result has a similar 
paradoxical flavor.  Just as there cannot be a social welfare ranking that satisfies four 
minimally reasonable conditions, there cannot be a coherence ranking that satisfies four 
seemingly plausible principles.   
Probabilism.  The motivation for probabilism is the following aspiration.  If we 
have justified background beliefs concerning the reliability of our sources and the 
chances that certain propositions might or might not be true, then the formal calculus of 
probability theory can be invoked to determine whether we are justified to believe the 
information that we have received from independent witnesses.  One of the determinants 
of whether we are justified to believe new information seems to be the coherence of the 
new information.  Hence the natural question to ask is how we can give a probabilistic 
interpretation of the notion of coherence.  There is an early attempt to provide such an 
interpretation in C.I. Lewis (1946: 338) and two recent attempts can be found in Shogenji 
(1999) and Fitelson (2003).  Our own theory is presented in Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003b).  Anti-Bayesian epistemologists may take our result to be evidence that what 
Bayesians are after is pie in the sky, but we would certainly like to see how much of the 
project can be salvaged.  
Holism.  No contradiction occurs as long as we conceive of coherence in an 
atomistic fashion.  One might suggest that our result enjoins us to think about whether we 
are justified to believe new items of information in a piecemeal fashion.  For every new 
item of information, we should ask how well it coheres with our background beliefs taken 
by itself and how reliable the informers are, and decide on the basis hereof whether to 
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believe the new information item.  But this is to give up on an important intuition that 
C.I. Lewis (1946: 346) and Bonjour (1983: 148) capitalize on.  We are often presented 
with information items such that we would not be willing to believe the new items of 
information if considered one by one, but as a whole we are willing to believe them due 
to their internal coherence. 
Separability.  There are some notorious cases of non-separability in the 
philosophical literature.  For instance, Kant argued in the Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (1990: 9) that, although it is better to have both a good will and, say, smarts, it 
is actually worse to be smart when the good will is absent (Oddie, 2001 and 2002).  But 
in cases where separability fails, the explanatory demand is higher.  It is not sufficient to 
say that the good will and smarts are conducive to value in agency.  The good will has a 
special status for Kant as a virtuous trait and is radically different from other virtuous 
traits such as smarts.  We know that highly coherent and highly expected information 
from highly reliable sources induces a high degree of confidence that the information is 
true.  In the absence of a special explanation, there is a presumption that the more 
coherent the information is, the more confident we may be that the information is true, 
ceteris paribus.  A special explanation can defeat this presumption, but we cannot see 
how a special explanation would go in this case.  One might question what should be 
subsumed under the ceteris paribus clause.  It is certainly a reasonable move to include 
the expectancy of the new information.  But we have shown that this move does not bring 
us an inch further once we move from information pairs to information triples. One could 
of course try to continue this line of defense by arguing that the determinants of our 
degree of confidence are the reliability of the new sources, the expectancy of the new 
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information, the coherence of the new information, and some other probabilistic feature.  
This strategy might work, but in the absence of a concrete proposal, there is little to argue 
against.  Alternatively, one can parse the coherence of an information set into multiple 
separable components.  This is the escape route from the impossibility result that we 
explore in Bovens and Hartmann (2005). 
Ordering.  We believe that this is indeed the weakest link in the quadruple.  
Suppose that we are confronted with two information sets.  Is it always meaningful to 
make a judgment to the effect that one information set is more coherent than the other?  
Of course there are cases in which we just lack the probabilistic information.  But let us 
restrict ourselves here to cases where the complete probabilistic information is present.  
For instance, suppose that the information sets contain medical data and that the 
probabilistic relations between symptoms and diseases are well known.  Sometimes, 
comparative judgment of coherence between two information sets are uncontroversial.  
For instance, suppose that one information set ascribes symptoms to a patient that all 
point in the direction of a single disease, while another information set ascribes 
symptoms that rarely coincide.  But sometimes, there may be complex relations of 
positive and negative relevance between the items of information in the information sets 
and it may not make much sense to say that one information set is more coherent than the 
other.  Once we give up on Ordering there is no reason to believe that we can construct 
the kinds of counter examples that we have presented earlier.  It might well be the case 
that we have picked information sets and their associated vectors so that it would make 
no sense to impose an ordering over such pairs.  We explore this particular escape route 
from the impossibility result in Bovens and Hartmann (2003a and 2003b: 28-55).    
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